Ozan Varol is Visiting Assistant Professor of Law at Chicago-Kent College of Law.
About Ozan Varol
Ozan Varol is a Visiting Assistant Professor of Law at Chicago-Kent College of Law. Effective July 2012, he will be an Assistant Professor of Law at Lewis & Clark Law School. Professor Varol’s principal research interests are in constitutional law and comparative constitutional law. His scholarship has focused on a comparative analysis of religion-state relations and inter-branch institutional conflict in the constitutions of majority-Muslim nations and the United States. His academic articles have appeared or are forthcoming in the Harvard International Law Journal, Iowa Law Review, Missouri Law Review, Texas International Law Journal, and Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law. Professor Varol is a former law clerk to the Honorable Carlos T. Bea of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. He received his law degree from the University of Iowa College of Law, where he graduated first in his class and served as the Editor-in-Chief of the Iowa Law Review. Professor Varol has a bachelor’s degree in planetary sciences from Cornell University.
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Military: The Fourth Branch of Government?
Using Turkey and Egypt as case studies, this article examines the constitutional and political role of the military following a military-run transition from authoritarianism to democracy. When the military deposes an authoritarian government to facilitate the elections of civilian leaders, as in the case of Egypt in 2011, the military ordinarily supervises the transition process to democracy. During the transition, the military behaves as a self-interested actor and entrenches its policy preferences into the new constitution drafted during the transition. As a result of constitutional entrenchment, the military becomes a de facto, if not de jure, fourth branch of government. This article analyzes the effects of that entrenchment on the normative quality of the democracy that emerges out of the transition. Does a continuing constitutional or political role for the military necessarily pose an impediment to democratic consolidation? Can the military, within limits, play a democracy-promoting role in a post-authoritarian society? How can the newly established democratic regime bring the military within civilian control? The article examines these questions and concludes by analyzing their implications for Egypt.