A constitutional court may play an important role in consolidating democracy after a constitutional transition, and it is important for this reason that constitutional courts are independent, yet accountable institutions. Constitutional Courts after the Arab Spring: Appointment mechanisms and relative judicial independence investigates how constitutional court appointment procedures can promote both judicial independence and judicial accountability to a democratically elected government, analyzing four models of appointments as they are applied in six countries (Germany, South Africa, Egypt, Iraq, Italy and Turkey).
This Report is a joint publication of Constitutional Transitions and International IDEA. It was prepared by the Constitutional Transitions Clinic as part of a series of reports:
- “Combating Corruption: Constitutional Frameworks for the Middle East and North Africa“
- “Constitutional Courts after the Arab Spring: Appointment Mechanisms and Relative Judicial Independence”
- “Decentralization in Unitary States: Constitutional Frameworks for the Middle East and North Africa”
- “Oil and Natural Gas: Constitutional Frameworks for the Middle East and North Africa”
- “Political Party Finance Regulation: Constitutional reform After the Arab Spring”
- “Semi-Presidentialism as Power Sharing: Constitutional reform After the Arab Spring”